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Abstract This article examines the relationship between foreign direct invest-
ment in the mineral sector and environmental regulation in developing countries.
It argues that two major trends in global mineral investment have emerged in
recent years: increased competition amongst developing countries to attract
mineral investment, and the development and proliferation of a standard set of
legal protections for mineral investors including access to international arbitra-
tion, prohibitions of expropriation without compensation, and commitments to
stability of the regulatory regime. Both of these trends may have implications for
environmental policy, which are examined in the paper both in general terms and
in the context of a detailed case study concerning mineral exploitation in Ghana’s
forest reserves.
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1 Introduction
Global flows of foreign direct investment (FDI), including mineral1 investment, are
overwhelmingly concentrated amongst Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) countries. However, for some developing countries,
their small share of the global flows of mineral investment can represent a con-
siderable share of overall FDI entering the country, and can contribute signifi-
cantly to state revenue (Sandbroke & Mehta, 2002, p. 2). At the same time it is
also the case that ‘‘[f]ew if any forms of economic development present the array
of potential environmental, social and economic problems of the mineral resources
industry’’ (Pring & Siegele, 2005, p. 129). There is no comprehensive international
agreement on mining (Dalupan, 2005, p. 153) and environmental regulation for the
sector in many developing countries is a relatively recent phenomenon (UNCTAD,
1997, p. 47). Furthermore, governments often lack the relevant tools and man-
power to properly enforce the environmental regulations that are in place
(Onwuekwe, 2006, p. 121). As Cohen (1996, p. 151) points out, ‘‘[w]ithout effective
environmental controls, developing countries risk suffering serious, irreversible
environmental harm’’ from large-scale mining projects. Thus the mining sector
provides a good case study for the analysis of the relationship between investment
and the environment in view of the environmental, economic and social impor-
tance of the sector in many FDI-host countries (Chudnovsky & Lo´pez, 2002, p. 62;
Sandbroke & Mehta, 2002, p. 2).
Against this backdrop, there are two important (and interrelated) trends
occurring in mineral investment, which reflect broader developments in interna-
tional investment generally: first, the increased competition amongst developing
countries to attract foreign investors; and second, the development and prolifera-
tion of a standard set of legal protections for those investors. The purpose of this
paper is to provide a brief overview of these two trends, with a particular focus on
how they may affect the regulation of the environment in developing countries,
and also to further explore these issues within the context of a detailed case study
concerning mineral exploitation in Ghana’s forest reserves. While both competi-
tion for investment and the legal protection of investment are subjects of intense
academic debate, which has included discussion of environmental issues (e.g. the
pollution haven hypothesis, see Sect. 2; and the legal discussion surrounding
investor-state disputes, see Sect. 3) these topics are rarely treated together. As a
result the links between the two trends are often not drawn. Furthermore, while
research on competition has been dominated by economic/statistical analyses and
legal discussions have been concentrated on a few disputes (mainly within the
context of the North American Free Trade Agreement/NAFTA2), few authors
have provided detailed case studies from the developing world. The paper con-
cludes with some lessons that can be drawn from the Ghanaian case, as well as
suggestions for further research.
1As Otto and Cordes (2002, p. II–3) correctly point out, the term ‘minerals’ can cover a wide range of
substances. In this paper, the term refers to metallic or industrial minerals (nickel, silver, gold etc.)
and excludes energy related minerals (petroleum, gas, coal) and radioactive minerals, which are
generally regulated by separate and specialised policies.
2Chapter 11 of the Agreement covers investment. See http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org.
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2 State competition for mineral investment
According to Oman (2000, p. 15), ‘‘[c]ompetition among governments to attract
corporate investment appears to have heated up in recent years’’. The reasons
postulated for this include: the large number of developing/transitional countries
that have moved from closed to market friendly economies in the 1980s/90s; the fact
that OECD governments have also moved to more deregulated and liberalised
economies and are seeking to attract more investment; the increased mobility of
capital; and the reduction in barriers to international investment (Oman, 2000,
pp. 15–16).
This competition is particularly evident in the minerals sector. The debt crisis,
combined with the deterioration in developing countries’ terms of trade led to a
global movement away from State control of the mineral sector, which began in the
late 1970s and gained momentum in the 1980s and 1990s (UNCTAD, 1997, p. 6).
Structural Adjustment Programmes developed by the World Bank/International
Monetary Fund also played an important role in driving this process. As Otto (1994,
p. 2) points out, the result is that mining companies have ‘‘unprecedented access to a
vastly increased portion of the planet’s land area’’. Thus,
at the turn of the millennium, international investors faced an increasing
number and variety of geologically interesting countries with acceptable legal
and fiscal frameworks. Consequently, countries have had to compete among
one another to attract investment into their minerals sectors on a continuing
basis (Williams, 2005, p. 38).
While mineral investors remain fundamentally ‘resource-seeking’ (Caspary &
Berghaus, 2004, p. 684), competition within a set of geologically favourable coun-
tries will be based on other factors. As Omalu and Wa¨lde (1998) state: ‘‘any country
with a favourable geology has to combine this with an attractive mineral investment
regime to attract considerable mineral sector investment’’. Otto and Cordes (2002,
p. III-3) found that around 120 countries have reformed their legal regimes for
mining since 1985.
With regard to the impact of state competition for foreign investment on the
environment, academic discussion has long been dominated by the debate sur-
rounding the ‘pollution haven’ hypothesis. This hypothesis relates to the notion that
investors will be attracted to countries with lower ‘environmental costs’, and that in
order to be competitive countries will attempt to keep such costs low;
A country provides a pollution haven if it sets its environmental standards
below the socially efficient level or fails to enforce its standards in order to
attract foreign investment from countries with higher standards or countries
that better enforce their standards (Neumayer, 2001a, p. 148).
Two closely related concepts are ‘industrial flight’ and the ‘race to the bottom’,
which Mabey and McNally (1999, p. 30) effectively combine into a comprehensive
definition of the whole phenomenon:
in order to attract investment, governments will undervalue their environment
through law or non-enforced regulation (the ‘‘pollution havens’’ hypothesis).
As a result, companies will shift operations to these countries to take advan-
tage of lower production costs (the ‘‘industrial flight’’ hypothesis). Both lead to
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excessive (sub-optimal) pollution in the host country and a potential race-to-
the-bottom in environmental standards.
Although it would be logical to assume that the pollution haven hypothesis emerged
out of a concern about the potential impacts that foreign investment could have on
environmental quality in developing countries, in fact, it was rather the threat of
industrial flight and concerns over potential job losses that first sparked an interest in
developed/OECD countries (Clapp, 2002, p. 11; Mabey & McNally, 1999, p. 30;
Oman, 2000, p. 92; Strohm, 2002, p. 29). As a result, many of the early studies on
pollution havens were actually pre-occupied with this one aspect of the overall
phenomenon. By the mid-1980s, researchers had concluded that the new strict
environmental regulations in developed countries had not caused industrial flight,
and thus rejected the validity of the pollution haven hypothesis as a whole (Strohm,
2002, p. 31).
However, despite the lack of evidence about industrial flight, public concern
about pollution havens did not dissipate. Furthermore, many researchers themselves
did not appear to be completely convinced. As Wheeler (2002, p. 6) notes, despite
the lack of evidence ‘‘caution is undoubtedly warranted because there is no theo-
retical reason why industries with exceptionally high pollution control costs should
ignore regulatory concerns’’. An opponent of the hypothesis would likely argue in
response that because environmental costs make up only a small proportion of a
company’s total costs, they will have little impact on a firms’ locational decisions,
particularly in comparison to other factors, which Oman (2000, p. 17) refers to as
‘‘fundamentals’’ (political and macroeconomic stability, market access, infrastruc-
ture etc.). However, it is also true that, particularly in certain industries, environ-
mental costs are on the rise, while at the same time industrial relocation is becoming
easier ‘‘[w]ith fewer barriers to foreign investments, easier repatriation of profits and
other commitments facilitating trade and capital flows’’ (Esty & Geradin, 1998, p. 9).
In the mineral sector, it is widely acknowledged that it ‘‘has become increasingly
more difficult to mine in most developed nations’’ (Otto & Cordes, 2002, p. III-3),
due in large part to ever more stringent environmental regulations.
Recently, researchers have found ‘‘statistically significant pollution haven effects
of reasonable magnitude’’ (Brunnermeier & Levinson, 2004, p. 38), and the earlier
consensus about pollution havens may be changing. In addition, there has been an
increasing amount of academic critique of the entire framing of pollution haven
research. Of particular relevance to this paper is the criticism that the scope of the
problem is narrowly confined by the definition of ‘dirty industry’ adopted by most
researchers who investigate pollution havens. The primary focus has been on the
manufacturing sector, ignoring the highly polluting resource extraction industries,
which make up the bulk of investment flowing to many lowincome countries (Clapp,
2002, p. 12; Mabey & McNally, 1999, p. 11). Neumayer (2001a, p. 173) notes:
Especially in the mining and other resource extraction sectors, multinational
corporations also at times do take advantage of low environmental standards in
the host country – an impact on the environment that is outside the pollution
haven hypothesis proper.
Environmental damage is also very narrowly defined in pollution haven research.
The data used to determine which sectors are highly polluting is largely emissions
data or information on expenditures related to emissions controls (Clapp, 2002,
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p. 12). Habitat destruction, biodiversity loss, and numerous other environmental
impacts are not captured by this limited scope. In the case of mineral production,
‘‘upstream problems (land and ecosystem degradation, acid mine drainage, slope
failures, etc.)’’ are the predominate concerns, particularly in the case of open-pit or
surface mining (Warhurst, 1994, p. 42).
Mabey and McNally (1999, p. 3) argue that
By asking the wrong question, and looking for the wrong evidence the
‘‘pollution havens’’ debate has deflected discussion away from more important
issues such as: the scale of economic activity relative to regulatory capacity and
environmental limits; broad development/environment linkages; resource use
and planning issues, and the complex policy and institutional failures linked to
competition for FDI both between and inside regional trading areas.
Many researchers appear to agree, and now advocate the abandonment of the
pollution haven debate and the adoption of a ‘‘more open-ended analysis of the
linkages between global trade and investment and environmental regulation’’
(Clapp, 2002, p. 12). In dismissing the value of continued research on pollution
havens, several authors have directed attention to a potential new avenue for
research on the relationship between investment and the environment. Neumayer
(2001b, pp. 20–21) argues that ‘‘what really matters is what policy makers believe,
not what economic theory and evidence says, and there can be no doubt that they
actually do believe that countries compete with each other’’ (emphasis added). The
notion that regulators fear raising environmental standards beyond the status quo
because they believe it may deter new investment or cause industrial flight has been
termed ‘regulatory chill’.
Regulatory chill is not restricted to an investor’s decision on where to locate, as it
is also acknowledged that established companies may apply pressure to host
governments to lower, not raise, or not enforce environmental regulations (Mabey &
McNally, 1999, p. 42). Furthermore, this new research paradigm broadens the scope
of environmental degradation beyond traditional notions of ‘pollution’. In doing so,
it also broadens the scope from purely local/national issues, to environmental issues
of global concern. In fact Neumayer (2001b, p. 3) suggests that:
A priori, we would expect ‘regulatory chill’ to be more prevalent with respect
to environmental standards concerning pollutants affecting the so-called global
commons, such as the global climate, the ozone layer, and biodiver-
sity...because in the case of the global commons, the benefits of raising envi-
ronmental standards have to be shared with all or at least many other countries
as well. In as far as capital flight is perceived to be one of the costs of raising
environmental standards, it will become relatively more important in this case
then, as the costs are balanced against dispersed benefits.
The method of enquiry proposed for evaluating regulatory chill is also in marked
contrast to that adopted for pollution haven research. Statistical analysis is difficult,
if not impossible, when one is looking for evidence of ‘‘what has not happened’’
(Mabey & McNally, 1999, p. 40). Thus, it is argued that the research should be
conducted by historians and political scientists, not economists, and should involve
detailed case analysis (Clapp, 2002, p. 17; Mabey & McNally, 1999, p. 40).
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3 State commitments to investment protection
Closely linked to the increased competition amongst developing countries to attract
foreign investment is the trend of countries to offer certain forms of legal protection
to investors. These legal protections are aimed at managing ‘political risk’ which
can be understood as the occurrence of events in the political sphere
(governmental actions, politically motivated insecurity in the country and
international conflict) which impede the normal operations of a business
venture with a detrimental financial impact on the commercial viability of the
venture (Wa¨lde & N’Di, 1996).
Such risk is inherent to all investment, but is perceived as particularly strong for
investments in developing countries, and also for those in the mineral sector, which
are seen as particularly vulnerable because they:
1) are highly capital-intensive investments that cannot be relocated; 2) use
relatively stable production technologies; 3) produce a homogeneous product
with little customer or brand name loyalty; and 4) operate in an oligopolist
industrial structure with limited competitors (Otto & Cordes, 2002, p. I-41)
Investment protection can be found in national laws, bilateral investment treaties
(BITs) (now numbered at over 23003), as well as in numerous regional treaties,4 and
many ‘state contracts’.
3.1 Bilateral investment treaties
BITs are agreements between two countries that concern the relationship between
an investor from one party, referred to as the ‘home state’, and the other contracting
party, the ‘host state’. While BITs work both ways (with each state able to act as a
‘home’ and ‘host’ to investors) they have generally been designed by the indus-
trialised world with the interest of Western investors in mind. The first BITs were
created to deal with the period of uncertainty following colonisation, and the main
purpose of BITs today is still to protect foreign investors in the developing world.
While an increasing number of BITs are now negotiated between developing
countries, there is a dearth of such agreements between industrialised nations
(Hallward-Driemeier, 2003, p. 8).
Though many BITs follow a similar pattern, there are differences among them
based on which countries were involved in the negotiation, and when they were
concluded. For example, BITs negotiated by the United States differ in certain ways
from those negotiated by most European countries, and early BITs are generally less
stringent and more vague than more recent treaties (Sornarajah, 2004, p. 216). While
there are several clauses common to BITs that are potentially relevant to environ-
mental protection, two of the most contentious5 and most relevant to the mineral
3The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD 2005d, p. 2) counted 2393
BITs, up to and including those concluded in 2004.
4UNCTAD maintains a compendium of international investment agreements, available online at:
http://www.unctad.org.
5See Sornarajah (in this issue) for a discussion of other clauses, such as fair and equitable treatment,
which are increasingly relevant.
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sector are access to international arbitration and prohibitions of expropriation
without compensation.
3.1.1 International arbitration
A state-to-state dispute settlement mechanism is present in the large majority of
international investment agreements. Arbitration provides an option beyond
diplomatic negotiations, but formal state-to-state investment disputes tend to be
quite rare (Peterson, 2005, p. 127). In the 1960s a second type of dispute settlement
mechanism began to appear, which allowed for arbitration between an investor and
the host state. There are two types of investor-state dispute settlement: ‘institutional’
and ‘ad hoc’.
Institutional dispute settlement involves a supervising institution that administers
the arbitration. The most common institution referred to in international investment
agreements is the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID). ICSID is a part of the World Bank Group and was established in 1966
when the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States came into force. Its most recent set of Rules and Regu-
lations entered into force in 2006.6 ICSID was designed expressly for the purpose of
handling investor-state arbitrations and does not handle disputes between firms.
Ad hoc arbitrations also follow sets of established rules; however, in these cases
there is no supervising institution. The most common ad hoc rules referred to in
international investment agreements and state contracts are those of the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). UNCITRAL was
established by the UN General Assembly in 1966 and was given the general mandate
to further the progressive harmonisation and unification of the law of international
trade.7 An integral part of the Commission’s work is the promotion of the
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958
‘New York Convention’). The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules were adopted in
1976.8
Investment treaties rarely require that foreign investors first exhaust domestic
legal remedies before proceeding to international arbitration, in contrast with other
international legal mechanisms.9 Foreign investors and advocates of international
arbitration argue that local courts in developing countries are ill equipped to deal
with investment disputes and, furthermore, that if asked to adjudicate claims brought
against their own State these courts ‘‘may hardly be able to resist the political
pressure inherent in this situation’’ (Bernardini, 2001, p. 246). International arbi-
tration, to the contrary, is commonly framed in the literature as neutral and depo-
liticised. However, in recent years, an increasing number of observers have
disparaged international arbitration for its lack of transparency, accountability, and
6The Rules and Regulations are available online at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/.
7See the UNCITRAL website at: http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/index.html, last viewed 06-07-
06.
8The full text of the Rules is available online at: http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/
arbitration/1976Arbitration_rules.html.
9For example the European Convention on Human Rights requires claimants to begin in local
courts.
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openness to third-party participants.10 Furthermore, it has been argued that inter-
national arbitration may particularly disadvantage developing countries, due to the
high costs of disputes,11 their lack of expertise and experience in dealing with
arbitration, and structural biases within the system.12
A plethora of investor-state disputes have sprung up in the last decade. The
cumulative number of all known13 cases brought under investment agreements was
219 as of November 2005, excluding instances where a notice of intent had been filed
but the request for arbitration had not (UNCTAD, 2005c, p. 2). This can be com-
pared to the end of 1994 when there were only 5 known cases. At least 61 govern-
ments (37 in the developing world) have faced investment arbitration (UNCTAD,
2005c, p. 3).
Concerns have been raised in the wake of several controversial investor-state
disputes,14 particularly within the context of NAFTA, that in some instances the
protection offered to investors may limit the ability of governments to regulate
investment for the protection of the environment, natural resources and other social
goods, and further that investor-state arbitration may not be an appropriate venue
for issues of public concern to be decided upon.15 Some authors have also hypoth-
esised that the threat of an investor-state dispute could have a chilling effect on
government policy (Gray, 2002, p. 311; Moltke & Mann, 2004, p. 30; Neumayer,
2001a, p. 87).
3.1.2 Expropriation
In the past, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s, the direct taking of foreign property
was one of the most significant risks to foreign investment, and usually came in the
form of what is termed ‘nationalisation’. Nationalisation of foreign property involves
the host government performing an outright taking of property in all economic
sectors or on an industry-specific basis. In contrast to nationalisation, ‘expropriation’
10See generally: Blackaby (2004), Garcia (2004), and Peterson (2005).
11According to an UNCTAD (2005b) report, companies have been known to spend up to
US$4 million on lawyers’ and arbitrators’ fees for an investor-state dispute, and countries can expect
an average tribunal to cost US$400,000 or more in addition to the US$1–2 million in legal fees.
12For a developing country perspective on investment arbitration see: Garcia (2004), and Sornarajah
(2002).
13Cases are not necessarily made public, and thus it is not possible to assess how many exist in total.
14See for example Compania del Desarrollo de Santa Elena SA v. Republic of Costa Rica (2000)
International Legal Materials 39(6), 1317–1337 (award available online at: http://www.worldbank.org/
icsid/cases/awards.htm), Ethyl Corp. v. Government of Canada. 1999. International Legal Materials
38(3), 700–737 (award available online at: http://www.dfaitmaeci. gc.ca/tna-nac/disp/ethyl_archive-
en.asp), Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States of America (case pending, preliminary documents
available online at http://www.state.gov/s/l/c10986.htm), Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States.
2001. ICSID Review 16(1), 165–202 (award available online at: http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/
awards.htm), Methanex Corp. v. United States of America. 2005 (award available online at http://
www.state.gov/s/l/c5818.htm), S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada. 2001. International Legal
Materials 40(6), 1408–1492 (award available online at: http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/disp/
SDM_archive-en.asp), Te´cnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States (ICSID
Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2) (award available online at: http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/
awards.htm).
15See for example Baughen (2001), Gantz (2001), Guzman (1998), Mann (2001), and Peterson
(2003).
378 Int Environ Agreements (2006) 6:371–394
123
involves takings targeted at specific properties and enterprises (many agreements,
however, refer to both nationalisation and expropriation as simply ‘expropriation’).
Outright takings are now considered rare in most parts of the world. However,
another form of taking, referred to as ‘indirect takings’ or ‘indirect expropriation’,
has become increasingly important. Indirect takings fall short of actual physical
taking of property, but result in the effective loss of management, use or control, or a
significant depreciation of the value of the assets of a foreign investor (UNCTAD,
2000, p. 4). Indirect takings can be further divided into ‘creeping expropriations’ and
‘regulatory takings’. Creeping expropriations involve the slow and incremental
encroachment on the ownership rights of a foreign investor, leading to the devalu-
ation of the investment. Regulatory takings are ‘‘those takings of property that fall
within the police powers of a State, or otherwise arise from State measures like those
pertaining to the regulation of the environment, health, morals, culture or economy
of a host country’’ (UNCTAD, 2000, p. 12).
The issue of regulatory takings is a particular point of concern from the
perspective of environmental protection, as well as other sensitive areas of public
policy. There is no comprehensive definition of what constitutes a regulatory taking
with many tribunals and academics suggesting ‘‘that a determination as to the
occurrence of an expropriation can only truly be undertaken on a case-by-case basis,
in light of all attending circumstances’’ (Fortier & Drymer, 2004, p. 314). Soloway
(2002, p. 31) explains the difficulty of developing a definition:
If the definition is too expansive, the argument goes, it could impose poten-
tially huge financial obligations on governments, create disincentives to enact
health and safety regulations, and introduce multiple distortions and social
inefficiencies. On the other hand, a definition that is too restrictive would
obliterate a key investment guarantee that protects foreign investors.
The ‘‘huge financial obligations’’ that could be imposed on governments relate to not
only the legal costs associated with defending a regulation in international arbitra-
tion, which can be significant, but also to the potential compensation payments that
can be awarded to the investor if a tribunal determines that an expropriation has
occurred.16
3.2 National mineral policy and state contracts
In addition to any general commitments to investment protection made by a state
under international agreements with other states, there may also be specific pro-
tections offered to mineral investors under national law or through contracts made
directly with investors.
According to de Sa (2005, p. 493), the ‘‘building blocks’’ of a successful mineral
policy are: a transparent legal and regulatory framework; a competitive, stable and
fair fiscal regime; strong institutions to implement them; and sound environmental
management systems. In addition, the mineral policy must be combined with
broader economic reforms, which includes ‘‘the establishment of a competitive
investment climate for private sector participation, including the liberalisation of
16For example, Ethyl Corp. sought $251 million from Canada, Metalclad Corp. sought $90 million
from Mexico, and Methanex sought a staggering $970 million from the United States. The actual
compensation awarded in a case is, however, usually lower than that sought by the claimant.
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investment laws, and deregulation’’ (de Sa, 2005, p. 495). Bastida (2001, p. 32) also
highlights that a key legal protection for many mineral investors is security of
mineral tenure;
At its most elementary, security of tenure implies the notion that the investor
has to be provided with the assurance of being able to develop a successful
discovery prior to committing sizeable resources to exploration, or the right to
proceed from the exploration to the mining stage (‘the right to mine’). How-
ever, in recent years the understanding of the concept has tended to broaden,
both to take account of the uncertainties involved in carrying out a mining
project, and the need to do it profitably.
In most developed countries mining rights are based only on law and regulation,
however developing countries have relied far more on agreements with investors
referred to as ‘state contracts’ (and sometimes as ‘concession agreements’ in the area
of natural resource exploitation) (UNCTAD, 1997, p. 9, 2004, p. 3). A state contract
can be defined as
a contract made between the State, or an entity of the State, which, for present
purposes, may be defined as any organization created by statute within a State
that is given control over an economic activity, and a foreign national or legal
person of foreign nationality (UNCTAD, 2004, p. 3).
Prior to the beginning of the decolonisation process, the concession contract was the
main form of agreement between a foreign mining investor and a national govern-
ment in the developing world. At that time, mining companies possessed greater
bargaining power as they had the support of their home states. Following decolo-
nisation, in the period defined by the move by developing countries to assert
sovereignty over natural resources, the bargaining power shifted, and many mining
contracts were renegotiated or the industries were nationalised. In recent years, with
the increased competition between states for mineral investment, Barberis (1998,
p. 3) argues that the bargaining power has begun shifting back in favour of mining
companies.
Despite the fact that mining companies may currently be said to have the
advantage in negotiating contracts, it is also the case that these contracts can be seen
as an ‘obsolescing bargain’ (Barberis, 1998, p. 54). This means that the power of the
foreign investor wanes dramatically over the period of the contract, as investment is
sunk into a project (Wa¨lde & N’Di, 1996). Thus investors are concerned that
governments may exploit their improved position and try to alter the terms of the
initial agreement. It is this risk that has motivated the move towards the ‘interna-
tionalisation’ of state contracts:
The theory of internationalization of contracts suggests...that the obligations
arising from a contract may reside in an external system. This external system
is variously described as transnational law of business, general principles of
law, lex mercatoria and even as international law. This theory states that the
use of certain clauses may have the effect of internationalizing the contract for
certain purposes, at least those connected with termination and dispute reso-
lution (UNCTAD, 2004, p. 6).
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State contracts often contain arbitration clauses referring to the dispute settlement
mechanisms already discussed in the previous section. There are also other
protections, however, which are not generally found in international agreements.
Particularly in the mineral sector, the high level of risk inherent in the activity, as
well as the scope and size of resources required has ‘‘led to the establishment by the
large multinational companies of a particularly refined system of contractual guar-
antees for the protection of their investments’’ (Bernardini, 2001, p. 236). This paper
will focus on the guarantee of stability.
3.2.1 Stability
According to Pritchard (2005, p. 80), ‘‘adverse change in law’’ (that is any change in
law which may adversely affect an investment) is the ‘‘most feared legal risk of
mining investors’’. One method of managing the risk of adverse change in law is the
use, in national law or state contracts, of stabilisation clauses, which ‘‘seek to pre-
serve the law of the host country as it applies to the investment at the time the state
contract is concluded, and which ensures that the future changes to the law of the
host country are inapplicable to the foreign investment contract’’ (UNCTAD, 2004,
p. 26). Stabilisation clauses were reported to have diminished in scope and frequency
in the 1970s, but they now appear to be re-emerging in even more extensive forms
than were previously observed (Wa¨lde & N’Di, 1996). This is particularly the case in
the resource extraction sector, where according to many authors, investments have a
greater need for stability than other shorter-termed industrial projects (Bernardini,
2001, p. 236; Wa¨lde & N’Di, 1996).
While stability of the fiscal regime is of primary interest to investors, there are
other issues for which it may be desirable to negotiate a stabilisation clause:
Perhaps most relevant at the moment is the imposition of new environmental
obligations by subsequent regulation or by an administrative/judicial ruling
re-interpreting existing law on which, arguably, the investment decision may to
some extent have been based (Wa¨lde & N’Di, 1996).
As Verhoosel (1998, p. 457) points out, even if a stabilisation clause does not
explicitly refer to environmental regulation it could effectively cover it. For example,
a stabilisation of the fiscal regime could cover market-based environmental mea-
sures. However, while advantageous to the investor, such clauses may be problem-
atic from the perspective of the regulator:
Environmental management is a dynamic activity, responding to growing
knowledge concerning the environment and anthropogenic threats to it, as
well as to changing perceptions concerning the seriousness of these threats...
An added level of complexity derives from the continuous development of
technologies designed to protect the environment. As these technologies
become available, policy must adjust to reflect new capabilities (Moltke,
2002, p. 358).
Applying the constraints of stability to the regulation of the environment, particu-
larly in the developing world, is thus a subject of legitimate concern.
Some authors have questioned the binding character of stabilisation
clauses, arguing that states cannot waive their sovereignty in such a manner
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(Bernardini, 2001, p. 242; Sornarajah, 2004, p. 408). However, despite the academic
debate, the crucial point is that tribunals have frequently affirmed the validity of
such clauses (Verhoosel, 1998, p. 456). Most observers would agree with Peter (1995,
p. 227) who argues that while stabilisation clauses cannot stop a government
from ‘‘doing what it pleases’’, the investor will be entitled to ‘‘comprehensive
compensation’’ in the instance of a breach.
In light of the problems associated with stabilisation clauses, many contracts
adopt a slightly less demanding alternative; the renegotiation clause:
By undertaking to renegotiate the contractual terms and conditions in case of
supervening circumstances of any kind, including new legislative or regulatory
measures, the State binds itself to conduct good faith negotiations with the
private investor with the view of maintaining the economic equilibrium of the
agreement as originally stipulated. An essential component of this type of
provision is the granting to the international arbitrator of the power to
determine the new economic equilibrium of the agreement should the parties
fail to find an agreement in this regard within a specified time-limit (Bernar-
dini, 2001, p. 242).
As with a breach of a stabilisation clause, renegotiation may result in compensation
requirements or other remedies to restore the ‘economic equilibrium’ of the con-
tract.
4 Case study: mining in Ghana’s forest reserves
In the previous sections it has been argued that developing countries are increasingly
driven to compete with each other to attract mineral investment and that as a
consequence they have made fairly substantial commitments to provide investors
with stability, protection from expropriation without compensation, and access to
international arbitration in the event of a dispute. There is considerable debate as to
the precise effect of these clauses; however in any event, as Otto and Cordes (2002,
p. IV-26) point out, ‘‘their effect may be more a psychological deterrent than a legal
one’’. This may be particularly true in developing countries, where concerns about
attracting investment are high, and the capacity to deal with disputes is low.
This section will explore these issues further in the context of a recent debate over
mineral operations in Ghana’s forest reserves. This case study is based on a variety
of sources, including interviews I conducted in June 2005 under the condition of
anonymity.
4.1 Background
Ghana has a very long history of mining, particularly of gold, dating back to pre-
Christian times (Akabzaa, 2000, p. 8) and in the colonial period was known as ‘The
Gold Coast’. According to Akabzaa and Darimani (2001, p. 17), in the period
following independence ‘‘generally, the vicissitudes in Ghana’s mineral industry
mirror trends in the global mineral industry’’. In the 1970s the mining industry was
the second largest foreign exchange earner for Ghana and provided jobs for thou-
sands of people in the rural areas. However, the state-owned mining enterprises
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were under-capitalised and the industry was facing collapse.17 From 1960 through to
1980, various modifications were made to the mining code aimed at attracting pri-
vate participation in the industry, ‘‘but these were quite cosmetic’’ (Akabzaa &
Darimani, 2001, p. 18) and for four decades (up to the 1980s) no new mine was
opened in Ghana due to a ‘‘myriad of problems faced by mining investors and
potential investors alike as a result of the economic, financial, institutional and legal
framework within which the sector operated’’18.
As in other African countries, deregulation of the mining sector in Ghana began
in the context of a Structural Adjustment Programme. Reforms in Ghana are
regarded as typifying the first phase of mining sector reforms undertaken in the
context of these programmes (UNCTAD, 2005a, p. 41). The mining sector received
priority attention under the country’s Economic Recovery Programme initiated in
1983, as this sector was considered key to the country’s economic revival (Campbell,
2004, p. 11). The World Bank carried out two major projects in the sector: first the
Mining Sector Rehabilitation project, approved in 1988; followed in 1995 by the
Mining Sector Development and Environment Project. A new Minerals and Mining
Law was put into place in 1986, and a Minerals Commission was developed. The
fiscal component of the laws was considered to be one of the most liberal at the time,
only surpassed by those of Papua New Guinea (Campbell, 2004, p. 11). The newly
formed Minerals Commission was charged with implementing the law as well as
overall responsibility for advising the government on mineral policy, reviewing
mining sector activities and serving as a one-stop shop for mineral investors.
According to a study by UNCTAD (2005a), investment in mining in Africa has
increased considerably in the past two decades and the region is now ranked third
behind Latin America and Oceania. According to UNCTAD (2005a, p. 39), this
increase ‘‘can be attributed in part to major changes in mining codes that have
helped orchestrate a state withdrawal from the sector, expanded opportunities for
the private sector and increased incentives to attract FDI’’. In Ghana, since the
inception of the Economic Recovery Programme the industry has seen phenomenal
growth. Over the period 1983–1998 some US$4 billion of private investment capital
went into mineral exploration, the establishment of new mines, and the rehabilita-
tion of existing ones.19 Gold has been particularly important; Ghana is now the
second largest producer of gold in Africa (after South Africa), and gold has replaced
cocoa as the leading foreign exchange earner (Awudi, 2002, p. 1). However, a
calculation by UNCTAD based on 2003 government figures showed that Ghana
earned only about 5% of the total value of mineral exports—about US$46.7 million
out of a total value of US$893.6 million (UNCTAD, 2005a, p. 50). Furthermore,
according to Awudi (2002, p. 1) the increased activity in the sector has not led to a
significant increase in employment.
17Letter from M. Karlsson, World Bank Country Director for Ghana, Sierra Leone and Liberia, to
National Coalition of Civil Society Groups Against Mining in Ghana’s Forest Reserves, December 4,
2003. Available online at: http://www.bicusa.org/bicusa/issues/Response_from_WBGhanaCountry-
Director_12-04-03.pdf.
18Ghana Minerals Commission website: http://www.mincomgh.org/minerals_sector/index.html last
viewed 06-07-06.
19Ibid.
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4.2 Ghana’s investment and mineral policy
The 1986 Minerals and Mining Law provides for referral of disputes to arbitration in
accordance with the UNCITRAL Rules, or within the framework of a bilateral
agreement between Ghana and the investor’s country. Ghana has so far concluded
21 BITs; some of the agreements have been ratified while others are still awaiting
ratification.20 Ghana is also a signatory to the 1958 New York Convention.
The mining law recognises three stages of mineral development, and an investor
requires a separate licence for each stage: reconnaissance (prospecting), prospecting
(exploration) and mining (Omalu & Wa¨lde, 1998). In terms of mineral tenure, there
is no automatic right for the holder of a reconnaissance licence to acquire a pros-
pecting licence, however, there is an automatic right for the holder of a prospecting
licence to obtain a mining lease (Addy, 1999, p. 237; Omalu & Wa¨lde, 1998). Mining
leases are valid for up to 30 years, and generally include renewal clauses (Addy,
1999, p. 237). Negotiations for licences and leases are normally led by the Minerals
Commission, and the constitution requires any contract or undertaking to be ratified
in Parliament by a two-thirds voting majority. However, ratification has little impact
on the substantive content of agreements (Ayine et al., 2005). According to Ayine
et al. (2005, p. 3), ‘‘[w]hether and when contracts become available to the wider
public depends on whether the Parliamentary Committee invites public comments
on the contract document; for most agreements placed before Parliament this does
not happen’’ and furthermore ‘‘a typical mining lease would likely bind the
government to treat all information submitted under obligations in the lease as
confidential for a period of five years, or until termination of the lease. Even then,
the consent of the company might be required’’ (Ayine et al., 2005, p. 4).
In the course of my research, three mining leases21 have been obtained from
company filings to the Security Exchange Commission in Washington, DC.22 These
examples may give some insight into the substantive content of Ghanaian mining
leases, however, it should be cautioned that other leases may differ significantly.
Furthermore, it should be noted that in addition to mining leases, a more recent
trend has been for companies to sign more general ‘investment agreements’ with the
government. For example, Newmont Mining Corp. signed such an agreement in 2003
20According to the Government of Ghana website (http://www.ghana.gov.gh/faq/faq-
ans.php?id=0000000022 last viewed 06-07-06) Ghana has negotiated BITs with Bulgaria, Burkina
Faso, China, Cote d’Ivoire, Cuba, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Guinea, Malaysia, Maurita-
nia, Mauritius, Netherlands, Romania, South Africa, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States of
America (signed with OPIC), Yugoslavia, Zambia. The BITs with Denmark, the United Kingdom,
The Republic of China, Romania and Switzerland have been ratified (according to the U.S.
Department of State 2005 Investment Climate Statement for Ghana, see http://www.state.gov/e/eb/
ifd/2005/43028.htm). The U.S. has in fact signed three agreements with Ghana (the OPIC Investment
Incentive Agreement, the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement, and the Open Skies
Agreement), however these are not traditional BITs.
21Mining Lease signed between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and Canadian Bogosu
Resources Ltd., 21 August 1987. Mining Lease signed between the Government of the Republic of
Ghana and Canadian Bogosu Resources Ltd., 16 August 1988. Mining Lease signed between the
Government of the Republic of Ghana and Bogoso Gold Ltd., 29 June 2001.
22All three leases are now under the control of Golden Star Resources Ltd. The 1987 and 1988 leases
can be found in Golden Star Resources Ltd. Form 10-K (Annual Report) Filed 3/29/2006 For Period
Ending 12/31/2005. The 2001 lease can be found in Golden Star Resources Ltd. Form 8-K Filed For
Period Beginning 10/25/2001. These filings can be found online at http://www.edgar-online.com
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with the government that covered its investments under three mining leases. While I
am currently unaware of the substantive content of this agreement, it has been
reported in the media that it contains stability clauses.23 This trend is in line with the
more recent changes proposed for Ghana’s mining law, which will be discussed
further in Sect. 4.4.
Returning to the content of the leases, it can be noted that with regard to envi-
ronmental provisions, they are quite general:
The company shall adopt all necessary and practical precautionary measures to
prevent undue pollution of rivers and other potable water and to ensure that
such pollution does not cause harm or destruction to human or animal life or
fresh water or vegetation (Article 8b of all three leases).
In terms of dispute settlement, the 1987 and 1988 leases refer to the jurisdiction of
ICSID for settlement by reconciliation or arbitration, while the more recent 2001
lease refers to UNCITRAL Rules (Article 35 of all three leases). All three leases
also have a second section to the arbitration clause, which stipulates that:
The Parties acknowledge and agree that this Agreement was made on the basis
of the laws and conditions prevailing at the date of the effective conclusion of
the negotiation of this Agreement and accordingly, if thereafter, new laws and
conditions come into existence which unfairly affect the interest of either party
to this agreement, then the party so unfairly affected shall be entitled to
request a re-negotiation and the parties shall thereupon re-negotiate. The
parties hereby undertake and covenant with each other to make every effort to
agree, cooperate, and negotiate and to take such action as may be necessary to
remove the causes of unfairness or disputes.
This clause gives a preference to re-negotiation, but also clearly provides the
investor with some stability.
4.3 Mining in forest reserves
Mining activities in Ghana are concentrated in the south of the country, as this is
where the most substantial mineral deposits are found. Incidentally, this is also the
area within which the majority of Ghana’s remaining forestland is located. Following
the launch of the Economic Recovery Programme, several gold mining companies
were granted permission by the National Defense Council (NDC) government to
carry out mineral exploration within forest reserves. Permanent forest estate, in the
form of reserves, was developed by the colonial government in the early part of the
last century, in recognition of the increasing pressures on Ghana’s forests and with
the intention to maintain climatic quality, protect watersheds and ensure an
environment conducive to cocoa production (Kotey et al., 1998, p. 23). The
demarcation of the forest estate was largely completed by 1939. While it is widely
acknowledged that much of the forest estate has been degraded despite the reserve
status, it has also been suggested that without the reserves ‘‘Ghana wouldn’t have
any forest left’’.24
23Newmont joins mining list’’ Ghana News Agency, 19 December 2003.
24Author’s confidential interview with a non-governmental representative (#3), Accra, June 2005.
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As early as 1992, the Forestry Commission was raising concerns about the
potential impacts that mining could have on the reserves:
Mining in forest reserves will imply abandonment of scientific management of
forest reserves and consequently loss of goods and services derived from our
forest heritage set aside 60–70 years ago. Ghana could be sanctioned by the
International Conservation organizations, which have credited Ghana with a
long history of responsibility for tropical forest conservation and management
(Tuffuor, 1992).
In 1996, based on the concerns about the depletion of the permanent forest estate
and the potential for mineral activities to accelerate this depletion, the Ministry of
Lands and Forestry placed a moratorium on mineral operations in forest reserves.25
However, by this time, some mining companies had already reached advanced stages
of exploration. The government selected seventeen companies, apparently on the
basis of the level of investment incurred and the state of exploration that had been
achieved, and determined that they should be allowed to continue with their
exploration activities.26 In 1997 the Operational Guidelines for Mineral Exploration
in Forest Reserves for Selected Companies were produced and put in place to reg-
ulate exploration activities and the selected companies were invited to re-apply for
Forest Entry Permits.27
Up until this point, the issue had not been widely publicised, however in 1998 the
non-governmental organisation Friends of the Earth (FOE) Ghana began to
investigate further. The group visited the exploration sites and spoke with compa-
nies, who claimed that if they found economically viable deposits they would be
given mineral leases.28 FOE-Ghana expressed alarm over the potential conse-
quences for forest conservation and founded a Coalition of Civil Society Groups
Against Mining in Ghana’s Forest Reserves (hereafter referred to as the FOE-
Ghana Coalition).
In response to the concerns that were increasingly being raised over the
possibility of mining in forest reserves, and in preparation for the expected
transition from exploration to mine development, the Ghana Chamber of Mines,
an association of representatives of mining companies operating in Ghana, took a
fact-finding mission to South Africa and Australia, bringing with them repre-
sentatives of the Forestry Commission, Environmental Protection Agency and
other institutions. The purpose of the trip was to view successful mining opera-
tions in forests in these countries. Upon return from the trip the Chamber
commissioned the preparation of the Environmental Guidelines for Mining in
Productive Forest Reserves. In one view the issuing of the Environmental
Guidelines followed ‘‘a thorough analysis and debates involving all stakeholders
25Newmont Ghana Gold Ltd. 2005. Environmental and Social Impact Assessment: Ahafo South
Project. Accra. Available online at: http://www.newmont.com/en/operations/projectpipeline/ahafo/
docs/envsocimpaccess.asp
26Chirano Gold Mines Ltd. 2003. Chirano Gold Project Scoping Report & Terms of Reference.
Prepared by SGS Environment, Project No. B246. Available in the Environmental Protection
Agency Library, Accra.
27Environmental Guidelines for Mining in Productive Forest Reserves in Ghana, May 2001, p. 1.
28Author’s confidential interview with a non-governmental representative (#3), Accra, June 2005.
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over a period of approximately 2.5 years’’ and they were provided in ‘‘a format
acceptable to the various interested parties and stakeholders’’.29 However,
members of the FOE-Ghana Coalition took a quite different view, pointing out
that there was no consultation with communities directly affected by mining or
forestry, or from civil society organisations.30 The Environmental Guidelines listed
twelve organisations as key contributors,31 all of which are either representatives
of the mining industry or government agencies, and furthermore, the funding for
the project came entirely from foreign mining companies leading one observer to
conclude: ‘‘the production of the document was funded by the mining industry
and it cannot be trusted since it merely parrots the wishes of the mining
industry’’.32 In any event, the guidelines are non-binding, and provisions are
frequently qualified by language such as ‘‘where practicable’’.
By the time the Environmental Guidelines had been published in 2001, a new
government under the New Patriotic Party (NPP) had been elected, and had thus
‘‘inherited the problem’’.33 Under increasing public pressure, the list of proposed
operations was decreased to five34 and the government undertook site visits. The
final approval for these operations came on 12 February 2003, in a letter issued by
the Ministry of Mines to the Ghana Chamber of Mines.35
The Ministry of Mines (now Ministry of Lands, Forestry and Mines) has defended
its decision to allow mining in forest reserves with several key arguments:36
• The companies had invested substantial sums of money: not allowing them to
proceed would mean that Ghana would have to compensate them and would also
discourage future investments in the industry;
• The benefits of mining in terms of jobs and local infrastructure and royalties to
the government outweigh the environmental consequences;
• The areas earmarked for mining are not pristine, they have already been de-
graded; and
29Chirano Gold Mines Ltd. 2003. See footnote 26.
30National Coalition of Civil Society Groups Against Mining in Ghana’s Forest Reserves: A pre-
sentation to the Ghanaian Media, 31 March 2004, Old Press Centre, Accra. Available online at:
http://www.bicusa.org/bicusa/issues/Coalition_press_statement_March04.pdf.
31Abosso Goldfields Ltd. (South Africa), Ashanti Goldfields Company Ltd. (South Africa), Birim
Goldfields Inc. (Canada), Environmental Protection Agency, Forestry Commission, Forestry Ser-
vices Division, Ghana Chamber of Mines, Knight Piesold Consulting (global consulting firm, with
representatives from Australia and South Africa), Minerals Commission, Mines Department,
Ministry of Lands and Forestry, Wildlife Division.
32‘‘Golden Greed: Trouble Looms over Ghana’s Forest Reserves’’, World Rainforest Movement
News Release. Available online at: http://www.wrm.org.uy/countries/Ghana/Goldengreed.html, last
viewed 06-07-06.
33Mr. Kwadjo Adjei Darko, former Minister of Mines, quoted in ibid.
34The companies were Newmont (United States), Nevsun Resources (Canada), Birim Goldfields
(acquired by Goldenstar Resources/Canada), Chirano Goldmines (acquired by Redback Mining/
Canada), and Satellite Goldfields (acquired by Goldenstar Resources/Canada).
35Chirano Gold Mines Ltd. 2003. See footnote 26.
36This summary of arguments is based on Tetteh (2004), various news articles quoted elsewhere in
this paper, and the author’s confidential interviews with mining investors (#1 & #20), government
officials (#2 & #12), non-governmental representatives (#3, #4, #8 & #11), representatives of inter-
national organisations (#6), and academics (#9, & #18), Accra, Kumasi and New Abirim, June 2005.
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• Stricter environmental controls will be placed on the companies (the Environ-
mental Guidelines) and they will be required to plant trees outside of their
concessions in addition to rehabilitating the mine area.
On the other hand the FOE-Ghana Coalition argued that:37
• The net return of mineral wealth despite the significant foreign investment inflow
into the sector is very doubtful;
• Forest reserves must be protected for their own sake because of the vital eco-
nomic, social and environmental functions they play which is necessary for the
quality of life we live on Earth;
• Mining in forest reserves contravenes various national policies and the principles
underlining the establishment of forest reserves in Ghana; and
• Mining in forest reserves contravenes international agreements to which Ghana
is signatory, such as the Convention to Combat Desertification, the Conservation
on Biological Diversity, and the Kyoto Protocol.
According to several sources in Ghana, the threat of international investment arbi-
tration was clearly made by companies with interests in the forest reserves, though there
is disagreement from the sources over whether this was a serious threat,38 or merely an
excuse used by the government to defend its position.39 The main companies involved in
the dispute were based in Canada, the United States and South Africa. Canada does not
have a BIT with Ghana, there is no record of a South African BIT ever having been
ratified, and the American agreements (a framework Agreement Concerning the
Development of Trade and Investment Relations and an Investment Incentive Agree-
ment) do not provide for investor-state dispute settlement. Therefore, it is unlikely that
any of the companies could have brought a dispute based on a claim of expropriation
under an international agreement. Furthermore, the companies did not have mineral
leases, which would have provided some level of stability. However, security of mineral
tenure in Ghana, as mentioned above, ensures that holders of a prospecting licence have
a right to acquire a mineral lease for minerals that they discover in the area covered by
the licence. This would have thus been the mostly likely basis for a dispute.
One publication in Ghana argued that ‘‘it is better for the government to refund
the money to the companies, rather than giving out concessions for them to destroy
the remaining forest reserves in the name of investment’’,40 however, others suggest
that the government simply could not afford to do so.41 Potentially even more crucial
than concerns over compensation payments were apprehensions about the impact
that the dispute would have on the image of the country in the eyes of investors in
both the mineral and other sectors. Several observers suggested that the government
feared arbitration not because they feared losing, but because they feared the impact
that denying the leases and proceeding to arbitration would have on their reputation
37National Coalition of Civil Society Groups Against Mining in Ghana’s Forest Reserves. See
footnote 30.
38Author’s confidential interviews with government officials (#7), academics (#9), and non-govern-
mental representatives (#11), Accra, June 2005.
39Author’s confidential interviews with non-governmental representatives (#8), and academics (#9 &
#18), Accra and Kumasi, June 2005.
40‘‘Whither the Mining Industry?’’ Public Agenda, 12 May 2003.
41Author’s confidential interviews with government officials (#7), and academics (#9), Accra, June
2005.
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as an investor-friendly country.42 It has even been suggested that the indecision over
whether to open the forest reserves to mining contributed to dwindling investment in
the country.43 In addition, at least one company seeking a concession inside a reserve
made it clear that its other potential investments in the country would be impacted
by the government’s decision.44
The other arguments made in favour of allowing the mining to go ahead include
the claims that other activities (e.g. illegal logging) contribute more to forest loss and
that, in any case, the forest reserves have already been degraded. According to one
publication ‘‘Ghana mine operators roll their eyes at the ‘reserve’ designations be-
cause locals have already plundered them’’.45 Even the former Minister of Mines
Cecilia Bannerman has reportedly stated that ‘‘many of these reserves are reserves
only on paper’’46 and the current Minister of Lands, Forestry and Mines, Prof.
Dominic Fobih, has also referred to the forests as ‘‘so-called reserves’’.47 Others take
a different view; disputing first of all the notion that the reserves in question are all
degraded and suggesting to the contrary that there are still areas of virgin forest.48 In
addition it has also been suggested that it is illogical to conclude that because an area
is degraded it should be ‘‘offered up for further degradation’’.49 Even a represen-
tative of one of the mining companies involved in the debate admitted that it was
understandable that there was controversy over mining, even if the forests were
degraded, because there was not much forest left in Ghana.50
In the end, the government’s compromise between the position of the investors/
Minerals Commission and that of the environmentalists/Forestry Commission was to
restrict the number of companies allowed to operate in the forest reserves and to
tighten the environmental requirements of those companies. The companies oper-
ating in forest reserves will not be permitted to build any additional facilities within
the reserves and will also be required to reforest the areas that they clear. However,
according to one forestry official, the idea of restoring the forest is a myth: ‘‘You fell
tropical trees and in place you plant grass and ornamental trees—you fell mahogany
and plant cassia—it is not the same. After mining the soil is unable to sustain
indigenous species’’.51 Officials from international organisations operating in Ghana
were even more pessimistic; ‘‘Resources from mining will never be reinvested in
forestry; rehabilitation doesn’t happen in Africa’’.52
42Author’s confidential interviews with non-governmental representatives (#4), representatives of
international organisations (#6), government officials (#13), and academics (#18), Accra and Kumasi,
June 2005.
43‘‘Ghana lures miners with new laws opening forests’’ Reuters, 20 February 2003.
44When Newmont found gold in two locations, one inside a reserve, it was reported that the company
‘‘wants both concessions or nothing’’. See ‘‘Ghana’s Gold Dilemma’’ BBC News, 4 February 2003.
45‘‘Country Winds up for Enviro-Mining Clash’’ Mineweb, 4 September 2003.
46Ibid.
47‘‘Minister Rekindles Mining in Forest Reserve Controversy’’ Public Agenda, 8 September 2003.
48Author’s confidential interviews with government officials (#2) and non-governmental represen-
tatives (#3, #4, #8, & #11) Accra, June 2005.
49Author’s confidential interview with a non-governmental representative (#11) Accra, June 2005.
50Author’s confidential interview with a mining investor (#20), New Abirim, June 2005.
51Author’s confidential interview with a government official (#13) Accra, June 2005.
52Author’s confidential interview with a representative of an international organisation (#14) Accra,
June 2005.
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4.4 Epilogue: the future of mineral investment in Ghana
It has been noted above that, when it was drafted, the 1986 Minerals and Mining
Law was considered very attractive for investors; however, times change. At the time
of writing, the Government of Ghana was in the process of drafting a new mining
law aimed at making the country more competitive vis-a`-vis other regimes (UNC-
TAD, 2003, p. 42). Draft legislation was submitted to Parliament in mid-2002 but
was withdrawn and resubmitted several times. In a draft of June 2005,53 it was clear
that there were clauses which could have implications for the regulation of the
environment. The key provisions are found in Sections 45 and 46, where investors
are given the opportunity to sign so-called ‘stability agreements’ and ‘development
agreements’ with the government. These agreements are binding and are subject to
international arbitration. A stability agreement ensures:
that the holder of the mining lease will not, for a period not exceeding fifteen
years from the date of the agreement;
a. be adversely affected by any new enactment, orders, instruments or other ac-
tions made under a new enactment or changes to any enactment, orders,
instruments that existed at the time of the stability agreement, or other actions
taken under these that have the effect or purports to have the effect of imposing
obligations upon the holder or applicant of the mining lease;
(Section 45)
According to the Minister of Lands, Forestry and Mines, Prof. Dominic Fobih, the
‘‘essence’’ of this provision is to ‘‘protect the holder of a mining lease for a period
not exceeding fifteen years from being adversely affected by future changes in laws
that result in heavier financial burdens being imposed on the holder’’.54 In addition
to the stability agreement, an investor may also enter into a development agreement,
if the proposed investment will exceed US$500 million. Such an agreement ‘‘may
contain provisions’’;
a) relating to the mineral right or operations to be conducted under the mining
lease;
b) relating to the circumstance or manner in which the Minister or the Com-
mission will exercise a discretion conferred by or under this Act;
c) on stability terms as provided under Section 45
d) relating to environmental issues and obligations of the holder to safeguard the
environment in accordance with this Act or other enactment; and
e) dealing with the settlement of disputes
(Section 46, emphasis added)
Butler (2004, pp. 74–75) has described similar clauses found in Tanzania’s 1998
Mining Act as a ‘‘legislative loophole’’, which ‘‘allows some rules to be suspended or
modified in favour of private corporate mining interests’’. The former Minister of
Mines in Ghana viewed it quite differently, stating: ‘‘Such agreements are mutually
beneficial to investors and government as they enable both parties to negotiate and
53A copy was obtained from the World Bank Office in Accra.
54Memorandum to the Draft Minerals and Mining Bill, dated 17 May 2005.
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agree on specified commitments and expectations’’.55 The Ghana National Coalition
on Mining (a group of organisations, communities, and individuals) is not convinced
of this and is strongly opposed to the inclusion of stability or development agree-
ments in the new Bill.56
5 Conclusions
There is no question that mining is a risky activity, both from an economic and an
environmental standpoint. It is understandable, therefore, that mineral investors
have sought to reduce the risks that they face by gaining legal protection for their
investments, while governments have sought to reduce environmental risks by
regulating the sector. The question is whether, in the struggle to compete for a
limited share of foreign investment, developing countries have been able to achieve
a balance between these competing interests, or on the other hand, whether too
great a burden of risk has been shifted to regulators, and to the broader public.
Arguably, in Ghana an appropriate balance between the protection of investment
and protection of the environment has not been struck. In fact, both the outcome of
the debate over mining in forest reserves and the provisions in the draft mining bill
suggest a worrying trend.
The Ghanaian case provides several lessons for researchers exploring the rela-
tionship between investment and the environment. First, while the literature on this
topic has been largely focused on developed countries, both in terms of the focus on
industrial flight in the pollution haven debate, and in terms of the focus on NAFTA
disputes in the legal field, the Ghanaian case shows that there is ample reason to
devote more effort to studying this relationship in the specific context of developing
countries. Such research is critical as foreign investment becomes ever more
important to the developing world, and as the rapid rise in agreements on investment
continues.
Second, the case illustrates how competition for investment and legal protection
of investment are intimately connected in a reinforcing relationship; governments
offer legal protections in order to compete for investment, and may in turn also try
to avoid investment arbitration in order to maintain their competitiveness. Thus, it
illustrates the limits of discussions, such as those surrounding the pollution haven
hypothesis and investor-state disputes, which fall along disciplinary lines.
Third, the Ghana case shows that in addition to international agreements (which
have recently been placed under the spotlight by non-governmental organisations)
national laws and state contracts also offer protections for investment which may
mirror those protections found in BITs, or even surpass them. Stability clauses or
agreements, in particular, have the potential to greatly influence the development of
environmental law in countries where they are employed. This is especially true in
the context of the mineral sector, where investments are generally long-term, with
contracts that can last thirty years or more.
55Speech by Cecilia Bannerman, Ghana Minister of Mines, at the Conference of Montreal’s CIDA/
IDRC International Forum Bringing the Best of the Private Sector to Development, 7 June 2004.
Available online at http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-61467-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html.
56Memorandum on the Minerals and Mining Bill 2005 Submitted by the National Coalition on
Mining (NCOM) to the Select Parliamentary Committee on Mines and Minerals, 8 June 2005.
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Finally, it would appear that the concept of regulatory chill is one which deserves
further consideration, as it appears to encapsulate all of the nuances of the Ghanaian
case. The Government of Ghana clearly believed that it risked losing investment if it
did not allow mining to proceed in the forest reserves. It also may have believed that
it would have had to compensate the companies involved. Thus the chilling effect is
found both in the threat of lost investment and the threat of arbitration. It is of
course not possible to draw far-reaching conclusions about the relevance of the
regulatory chill hypothesis to the entire developing world from one example in one
country. However, it is fair to suggest that it is an area of research that warrants
further inquiry. While such inquiry will undoubtedly prove difficult, it is essential to
the development of a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between
investment and the environment, which in turn, is critical for any project that aims to
make investment sustainable.
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